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WARS AND RUMOURS OF WARS
Japanese Plans to Invade the Philippines, 1593–1637
Stephen Turnbull

O

n three occasions between 1593 and 1637, the incumbent rulers of Japan
gave serious consideration to sending military expeditions against the Spanish rulers of the Philippines. None of these proposed invasions ever set sail, but
an examination of the plans made and the reasons they were not put into effect
sheds considerable light on Filipino-Japanese relations during the late sixteenth
and early seventeenth centuries. As all three ventures foundered partly because
of a lack of naval capacity, these little-known schemes also provide important
information about Japan’s military capabilities at this time in its history.
Spanish colonists first arrived in the Philippines in 1564 as a result of an expedition from the Americas under Miguel López
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and Pablo Carrion drove Japanese pirates from an enclave at the mouth of the
Cagayan River.2 It is in the accounts of such operations that we find the first
descriptions in any European language of Japanese military techniques and martial customs, from death-defying charges to acts of ritual suicide. So impressed
were the Spanish by these warriors that they began to recruit mercenaries from
pacified wakō and also from within the expatriate Japanese community. However,
even though Japanese bravery was recognised and valued, there was a noticeable
undercurrent of fear that one day these independent-minded warriors might rise
up against their employers. In its most extreme form, that fear envisaged a local
uprising in support of an invasion of the Philippines from Japan—an event that
was by no means a remote possibility.
HIDEYOSHI AND THE PHILIPPINES, 1592–98
The earliest written mention of fears of a Japanese invasion in the broadest sense
of the word appears in a Memorial to the Council of 1586, in which there is speculation within Manila that the Japanese wakō might have greater ambitions beyond
mere plunder: they “make a descent almost every year, and, it is said, with the
intent of colonizing Luçon [Luzon].”3 That never happened, but in 1591 the first
proper invasion scare began when the Philippines entered the consciousness of
Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536–98). By means of a series of brilliant military campaigns, Hideyoshi had reunified Japan after the chaos of a century of civil war,
and he now set his mind on overseas expeditions. The addition of the Philippines
to his megalomaniac aims was credited to a certain “Farandaquiemon [Faranda
Quiemon]—a Japanese of low extraction,” who induced Hideyoshi “to write in
a barbarous and arrogant manner to the governor, demanding submission and
tribute, and threatening to come with a fleet and troops to lay waste the country.”4
Farandaquiemon was a Japanese Christian merchant from Sakai called
Harada Kiemon. He had visited Manila on several occasions, most recently in
1591, and, having looked at its defences, he returned to Japan convinced that
the city could be taken easily.5 Together with his colleague Hasegawa Sōnin, described as a “court favourite,” Kiemon persuaded Hideyoshi to write his arrogant
letter to the governor of the Philippines.6 Hideyoshi’s military strength and his
unification of Japan had become known in Manila, so the bombastic letter begins
with a reference to these military triumphs and his miraculous birth that had augured Hideyoshi’s destiny to rule other nations. The threats appeared later in the
missive: “If an ambassador is not sent, I shall unfurl my banner and send an army
against that country to conquer it with a multitude of men; so that that country
will repent at not having sent me an ambassador.”7
The Spanish sent back a reply dated 1 May 1592 that was delivered to Hideyoshi by the Dominican friar Juan Cobo. Cobo traveled to Japan with a Chinese
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss4/10
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Christian called Antonio López, who appears to have been sent as a spy. Cobo and
López met Hideyoshi at Nagoya Castle, the military base in Kyushu built for the
invasion of Korea. “Cobo showed the king of Japon [Japan] the kingdoms of our
king on a globe. He gave this to the king, with the names of the kingdoms written
in Chinese characters, with the distances between them.”8 Harada Kiemon then
took personal charge of a second Japanese embassy to Manila. The Japanese delegation and Cobo’s embassy left for the Philippines in two separate ships, which
was fortunate in view of the disaster that would overcome the embassy, because
Cobo’s ship was wrecked off Taiwan and he died at the hands of aboriginal headhunters. Antonio López arrived safely in Japan aboard Harada’s vessel.9
Harada Kiemon began his address to the council in Manila by stating that
Hideyoshi had laid on a magnificent reception for Juan Cobo because he “knew
that the Spaniards are a warlike nation.”10 Impressive though Kiemon was, the
council gave much more attention to debriefing Antonio López, who certainly
knew how to gather information. On 1 June 1593, López was questioned closely
under oath about what he had seen and done in Japan, with most of the questions
relating to his knowledge of any Japanese plans for an attack on the Philippines.
López said first that he had heard that Hideyoshi had entrusted the conquest to
“Kunquyn,” which probably refers to Harada Kiemon.11 There was also a possible
motive, because “[i]n Japon there is universal talk of the abundance of gold in
this land. On this account, the soldiers are anxious to come here; and are coming,
as they do not care to go to Core [Korea], which is a poor country.”12 López also
stated that the Japanese had interrogated him about the military strength of the
Philippines. He seems to have tried misinformation on that point, even though
his initial reply had caused some arrogant amusement: “The [Japanese] laughed
when they heard Antonio say that these islands contained four or five thousand
Spaniards. They said that the defense of these islands was merely a matter for jest,
for one hundred of the Japanese were worth two or three hundred of us.”13
López also mentioned that three large ships were being built in Japan, although
he did not know their purpose, and he warned his hosts that in his opinion the
Chinese community in Manila could not be trusted.14 López also had overheard
the Japanese discussing the likelihood of the Philippines being reinforced when
under attack. “[F]our months are needed to go from Mexico to Luçon,” said
López, “and on this account but few soldiers could come from Mexico. Japan is
not more than twenty days’ journey distant, and therefore it would be well for us
to appreciate this fact.”15 In terms of Harada Kiemon’s personal ambitions, everyone López had met believed that when the Philippines were conquered he would
become the governor.16
More interesting details then emerged about the size of the invading army, although the figures were very vague. López heard in “Hunquin’s house” (probably
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
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referring to Hasegawa Sōnin) that one hundred thousand would be sent, but
when López (modifying his earlier figures) told them that the Philippines only
contained five to six thousand soldiers, of whom no more than three to four
thousand guarded Manila, the Japanese said that ten thousand would suffice. His
host later told him that they had decided further that no more than five to six
thousand men would be needed, conveyed on ten large ships.17
The final point López covered was the invasion route: “[T]hey will come by
way of Liuteui [the Ryukyu Islands, modern Okinawa Prefecture].”18 An invasion
route via the Ryukyus and then Taiwan was the sensible one; it avoided open seas
for the maximum amount of time, and it is only five hundred miles from Taiwan
to Luzon. This was exactly the route the Japanese chose in World War II, when
they attacked the Philippines from Taiwan, with additional forces landing farther
south on Luzon from Amami-Ō-shima.
The threat was sufficiently serious for the Spanish to take specific defensive
precautions, and López’s information, limited though it was, probably proved
helpful. A document entitled “Luzon Menaced by Japanese” by Governor Gómez
Pérez Dasmariñas ordered the citizens to stockpile food and arms. All ships coming from Japan were to be searched. Twenty vessels would be stationed in the
river below the artillery of the fort, with all other boats being moved upstream.
The invaders could not then use the latter to build defences, and the seacoast
would be kept clear for fighting. No ship was to leave without permission lest
its crew be caught and interrogated, nor should any gold or silver be moved out
of Manila. It also was recommended that the Japanese residents of Manila be
moved to a settlement outside the city, and Japanese servants monitored closely.19
Then a review was held of the available troops, including retired men who still
held weapons. It was estimated that the defence of Manila alone required one
thousand men, or six hundred at the least. The latter figure was the one included
in the document, which implies that six hundred men were all they had. Other
strongpoints required fewer, and there would be twenty-five soldiers on board
each of four vessels to guard the coasts. The total strength available to withstand
a Japanese attack was put at a disappointing 1,517 men, only a quarter of the
number about which López had told the Japanese in Nagoya. Spanish defenders
were outnumbered four to one, using his lowest estimate of the invading forces.20
The Philippines remained on high alert for four years after Harada’s visit, and
during that time the Spanish authorities closely monitored Hideyoshi’s military
expedition against Korea. It was launched during the summer of 1592 and rapidly
changed from being a blitzkrieg success to a long and painful retreat. The Korean
campaign revealed a major Japanese weakness in naval warfare and support, and
one of the main reasons for Japan’s eventual defeat was that the Korean navy
severed Japan’s lines of communication between Busan and the Japanese island
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss4/10

NWC_Autumn2016Review.indb 110

4

9/15/16 12:47 PM

Turnbull: Wars and Rumours of Wars: Japanese Plans to Invade the Philippine

TURNBULL

111

of Tsushima.21 The encouraging lesson was not wasted on Manila. If Hideyoshi
could not control the Tsushima Strait, how could he ever contemplate sending an
invasion fleet as far as Luzon?
As his Korean incursion dragged on, Hideyoshi grew increasingly suspicious
concerning the activities of Portuguese and Spanish missionaries in Japan. An
active persecution of Christianity followed, and Japan’s first martyrs died in
February 1597. One of them, Fray Martin of the Ascension, wrote a letter to the
governor of the Philippines as he was on his way to his execution. It includes what
he had heard about Hideyoshi’s intentions toward the Philippines. “It is said that
next year he will go to Luzon, and that he does not go this year because of being
busy with the Coreans.”22 Martin also commented on the invasion route, whereby
“he intends to take the islands of Lequios and Hermosa [Ryukyus and Taiwan],
throw forces from them into Cagayan, and thence to fall upon Manila, if God
does not first put a stop to his advance.”23
Manila gave some consideration to a preemptive Spanish occupation of Taiwan
but, as Fray Martin had envisaged, God put a stop to Hideyoshi’s plans. Hideyoshi
died in 1598, the troops in Korea were recalled, and no fleet sailed for Manila. A
Spanish reconnaissance of Taiwan may well have been carried out at this time, but
no attempt was made to exert control over the island. That had to wait until 1626,
when the Spanish established Fort San Domingo (modern Keelung).24
THE PHILIPPINES AND THE MATSUKURA FAMILY, 1630–31
Japanese naval weakness would come up again as a crucial factor when an invasion of the Philippines was considered for a second time, in 1630.25 Japan was
now under the rule of the Tokugawa family.
The persecution of Christians had intensified since the time of Hideyoshi, and
now the only contact Japanese Christians had with the outside world was a handful of brave priests who entered Japan secretly. The Japanese authorities believed
they spread sedition and encouraged disobedience, and most of them came by
way of Manila, so an invasion of the Philippines would be a heavy-handed way of
closing the loophole once and for all.26
However, trade between the two countries was acceptable to both sides. Silver
was an important commodity, and Japanese mines yielded perhaps a third of
global silver production during the period covered by this article.27 As Antonio
de Morga wrote, “[I]t is well to keep the king of Japon friendly by this means. For
if he were not so he would be the greatest enemy that could be feared, on account
of the number and size of his realms, and the valor of the people therein, who are,
beyond comparison, the bravest in all India.”28
The 1630 invasion scheme was associated almost completely with a single
enthusiast: Matsukura Bungo-no-kami Shigemasa (1574–1630), the daimyō
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(great lord) and notorious tyrant of Shimabara in Hizen Province, whose cruel
treatment of the people and persecution of Christians is very well recorded.29 The
Philippines entered Shigemasa’s consciousness in 1624 when two ships belonging
to the Matsukura were blown off course and ended up on the islands. On returning to Japan, their captains spoke enthusiastically about the considerable mercantile activity that existed between Japan and the Philippines and how Shigemasa
might be able to gain control of it by means of a military expedition.30 Shigemasa
took no immediate action, because it would have been without precedent for any
daimyō to act in such a manner purely on his own initiative, rather than by direction of the shogun. But then an incident occurred that provided him the opportunity for an authorised expedition to the Philippines—to avenge an insult to Japan.
The affront had its roots in Macao, where in 1622 the Portuguese heroically
had beaten off a Dutch attack. A handful of Japanese mercenaries had served on
the Dutch side.31 The attempt caused such alarm in Manila that the Spanish sent
reinforcements to Macao in case of a renewed incursion. The Spanish troops were
ordered to stand down in 1624, but instead of sailing straight home to the Philippines their leaders chose to engage in a leisurely piratical expedition.32
Among their targets was Siam, where they preyed on the local freight vessels
“carrying as merchandise, rice, considerable pepper, and some cloth. The last
named was much needed by the infantry, who already had no shirts on account
of the long voyage.”33 One of the ships they attacked and burned belonged to the
king of Siam, but the Spanish pirates really exceeded their brief when they attacked a Japanese “red seal” ship—an authorised trading vessel. It had been sent
to Siam by the machidoshiyori (town elder) of Nagasaki, Takaki Sakuzaemon.34
The Spanish account of the affair is very shamefaced; it admits that “[o]ne
[ship] was Japanese, and carried drugs and merchandise. It was captured in good
faith, but the justification of this act is being discussed. It is thought that the Japanese will be remunerated for the injury received, as they ought not to have been
harmed.”35 The most serious aspect of the incident was the appropriation of the
red seal—an act that amounted to an attack on the shogun’s personal authority.36
A profound apology subsequently was conveyed to Nagasaki.
No acknowledgement came from the Japanese side, and at its meeting in Manila on 16 January 1629 the council decided to take the matter no further, while
minuting four reasons why relations between Spain and Japan were at such a low
level. The first was that Spanish trade had been embargoed, not for commercial
reasons, but because of its links to Christianity. The second point was that the
Japanese had refused to receive any Spanish ambassadors. The third referred to
the “old time robberies” of the Hideyoshi era and his threats of invasion, a theme
echoed in the Spaniards’ understanding of the current situation in their fourth
point:
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss4/10
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Because . . . the Japanese had news of the richness of these islands, they have always
tried to conquer them, by endeavoring to get a foothold on the island of Hermosa, in
order to make it a way-station for the conquest of Luzon. That has caused the governors of Philipinas to make great expenditures and vast preparations during the past
few years; and but recently it is learned that discussions of this kind are rife in Japon
and that their reason for not doing it is not the lack of malice but of power.37

Matsukura Shigemasa possessed both malice and power. He realised the opportunity that had fallen into his lap, and he addressed the rōjū (the shogun’s
senior advisory council) in Edo as follows:
Luzon is governed by the Western country [Spain], and that country in conjunction
with Namban [Portugal] is ever looking for an opportunity to invade this empire.
For that reason there is a fear that our country will be disturbed. All who come from
Spain to Japan touch at Luzon. Therefore if I shall conquer that country with my own
troops, place my own agents there, and thus destroy the base of the Westerners, this
country will be secure for years to come. If I be permitted I will cross over to Luzon
and conquer it. I pray that the vermilion seal of the Great Lord, giving me an estate of
100,000 koku there, may be granted me.38

To his own desire for territorial expansion and personal wealth Shigemasa
therefore had added as justification the possibility of invasion of Japan by Spain.
While holding back from a binding commitment to send Japanese troops to Manila, the shogun gave Shigemasa permission to investigate it as a potential target
and to make military preparations. On 14 December 1630, with the cooperation
of the Nagasaki bugyō (commissioner) Takenaka Umene, Shigemasa sent two
retainers called Yoshioka Kurōemon and Kimura Gonnojō to Manila to spy out
the Spanish defences.39 They were disguised as merchants and their cover story
was that they wished to discuss the development of trade. Each had ten ashigaru
(foot soldiers) under his command, but during a stormy return crossing all ten
of Kimura’s men perished.
While they were away, Shigemasa continued his military preparations. The
paucity of sources for what appears to have been the most serious attempt to
invade the Philippines is regrettable, although the omissions may indicate simply
that certain crucial aspects were never considered. All that is known for certain
is that Shigemasa amassed three thousand bows and muskets for his army.40 As
these are foot-soldier weapons, one might envisage an additional 1,500 footsoldier spearmen and half that number of samurai with noncombatant support
troops, making the total numbers in Shigemasa’s army about the same as the
five to six thousand reported by Antonio López in 1593. There is no mention
of naval support in the very meagre sources, nor is any indication given that
Shigemasa knew that the important way station of Taiwan had acquired a Spanish fort since the time of Hideyoshi. Finally, no consideration was given to the
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
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need for artillery against the walls of Manila, but that omission possibly could
be explained by the fact that Shigemasa was awaiting the arrival of his spies with
the relevant information.
The men returned to Japan in July 1631. No records of the intelligence they
brought back with them have survived, but their information is unlikely to have
been either profound or accurate, because they were a far cry from the ninja of
Japanese martial fantasy. The authorities on the Philippines knew exactly who
they were and the real purpose of their visit, as is confirmed by the unsigned
“Events in Filipinas” of 2 July 1632:
In Japon they are still pricked with the thorn of the ship which some years ago our
galleons captured and burned on the bar of Sian. To avenge this, notable councils
have been held in Japon, in order to come and wage war against this land; in order
beforehand to have it well explored, they sent last year in January two merchant ships,
under cloak of trade and traffic. Although in Manilla warning of this double object
had been received, this was not made known; and they were received and regaled as
ambassadors from the Tono of Arima and Bungo. A ceremonious reception and very
handsome present were given to them; but the city was put in readiness for whatever
might happen.41

A separate Jesuit source suggests that a deliberate attempt was made to impress
on the spies the futility of attempting to take Manila by force. It comes in a report
sent to Spain on 29 July 1631 by Hernando Pérez. In it he stated unambiguously
that Yoshioka and Kimura were “sham envoys sent to investigate our situation
in order to have an easy conquest of our country.” Pérez confirmed that presents
were given and banquets were held. “However, although on the surface there was
a warm reception, in reality there was a display of military strength in accordance
with a situation of war. As the envoys passed through the town the army units
were lined up from the seashore to the governor’s residence.” Pérez concluded
that the envoys were “amazed” by what they saw.42 Their undercover mission
therefore came to nothing.
The mission was nullified anyway by the unexpected death of the invasion
commander, Matsukura Shigemasa.43 He had died suddenly in a bathhouse in
Obama while his spies were still in Manila. Murder was suspected.44
THE DUTCH AND THE FINAL INVASION PLANS, 1637
No further considerations were given to an expedition against the Philippines
for another five years, but while Christian refugees from Japanese persecution
continued to arrive in Manila, so also continued the much smaller reverse flow
of secret priests to Japan. The last of the line, Father Sidotti, would arrive in
Japan in 1708. It may have been only a trickle, but it was enough evidence of
a continuing Christian problem to ensure that the idea of an invasion of the
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss4/10
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Philippines rumbled on after Shigemasa’s death. Shigemasa was succeeded by his
son Matsukura Nagato-no-kami Katsuie, who proved to be as much of a tyrant
and enemy of Christianity as his father, and it is during Katsuie’s reign as daimyō
of Shimabara that we encounter the hatching of the final scheme to invade the
Philippines. Once again there was concern about the lack of Japanese naval
capacity—a deficiency that possibly could be made up by Japan’s loyal trading
partners from the Dutch East India Company (the Company).
The instigator of the 1637 invasion plans was neither Matsukura Katsuie nor
his master, the shogun Tokugawa Iemitsu, even though the Dutch were convinced the shogun was to blame.45 Instead it appears to have been the brainchild
of the two current bugyō of Nagasaki, Sakakibara Hida-no-kami Toshishige and
Baba Saburōzaemon Motonao, who hoped thereby to curry favour with their
superiors. The matter was raised at a meeting held toward the end of September
1637 with François Caron of the Company.46 Caron long had been insisting that
all Japanese trade should be shifted from the Portuguese to the Dutch, and one
plank of his argument had been to contrast the Portuguese willingness to flout
Japanese laws with the Dutch attitude of docile obedience.47
The bugyō listened respectfully to Caron, then changed the subject to
help from the loyal Dutch to destroy the Iberian bases of Manila, Macao, and
Keelung.48 Of these three potential targets, the bugyō believed Manila was the top
priority because its status as the source of supply for Catholic priests would be the
best bargaining counter to use with their superiors in Edo when the time came to
gain official permission to invade.
That was of course essential, but so was an army—and the bugyō were civilian officials, not commanders of samurai. The invading army would have to be
supplied either by the shogun or by a daimyō, such as Matsukura Katsuie, acting
on the shogun’s behalf. As for numbers, apparently an expeditionary force of ten
thousand men was envisaged, although this is only a supposition based on comments made after the expedition had been canceled.49 That figure would have
been twice the estimated number that Matsukura Shigemasa had planned for
1630, so other daimyō would have had to be involved as well. The bugyō were,
however, astute enough to realise that once again naval power would be a serious weakness, so a guarantee of Dutch naval support would ensure that the army
could be transported. It also would reduce the costs of the operation, which was
another positive point to place before the shogun.
The bugyō did not approach the matter as supplicants. Instead they broached
the subject in an assertive manner by challenging the Dutch to explain why,
if they had the command of the sea, as they so often claimed, Manila had not
become theirs already. Was it not also true that they had made an attack on Macao in 1622 and had been repulsed? Caron replied with a long and not entirely
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
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accurate account of the 1622 expedition that sidestepped the reasons for the defeat. The inclusion of Japanese mercenaries in the Dutch attacking force was not
mentioned; the bugyō were unlikely to have heard of it, and the Dutch would not
have admitted that Japanese were involved on the losing side.50
As for attacking Manila in 1637, it was by then one of the most heavily fortified places in East Asia. Caron had no desire to assault it, nor even to transport
samurai to do so, and he finished by suggesting meekly that the Dutch were now
more merchants than soldiers. Besides that, he said, their fleet was already fully
committed to existing responsibilities. One of the bugyō seemed to accept Caron’s
excuses, while the other kept shaking his head, but neither was inclined to give
up. The next day Heizō Ietsugu, the daikan (magistrate) of Nagasaki, presented a
document for the Dutch to sign that would commit them in no uncertain terms
to supporting an invasion:
Recently we have understood that the people of Manila are breaking the emperor’s
prohibitions and are sending priests, who are forbidden in Japan. As a result, they are
viewed as criminals by Your Honours. If the High Authorities decide to destroy this
place, the Hollanders, who bring a good number of ships to Japan every year, are always ready, in time or opportunity, to present our ships and cannon for your service.
We ask that Your Honours trust and believe that we are, in all matters without exception, ready to serve Japan.51

The text of the document contained such a firm commitment to act that Caron
could not have signed it there and then; it would have to be passed up the Company’s chain of command. The bugyō were not surprised by that response, but before taking their leave they took pains to remind the Dutch that their reputation
for loyalty was regarded as akin to the fidelity pledged to the shogun by his own
daimyō. That point was not lost when the document came to be discussed by the
Dutch at a higher level, where the choice was clear. They had to decide between
abandoning their reputation as servants of the shogun, with all the implications
for trade such a move would have, and the huge dangers of committing men and
resources to an overseas military expedition that could result in the destruction
of the Company’s entire fleet. They chose danger, and agreed to convey the Japanese army of invasion to the Philippines on six Dutch vessels.
Dutch support having been pledged, the matter was placed before the shogun, who agreed that the invasion should go ahead. His decision may have been
influenced by the recent arrival of another group of missionaries from Manila
under Father Marcello Mastrilli.52 No mention was made of who would supply
the invading army.
Matsukura Katsuie was the obvious candidate, but he soon became involved in
a serious development that would sound the death knell for the entire expedition.
An uprising on the nearby Amakusa Islands quickly spread to the Matsukura
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss4/10
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territory of Shimabara. The predominantly Christian rebels barricaded themselves inside Hara Castle, the dilapidated fortress that Matsukura Katsuie’s father
had replaced with Shimabara Castle. The quelling of what became known as the
Shimabara Rebellion soon proved to be beyond the capabilities of Matsukura
Katsuie. It sucked in all the military resources of the Tokugawa shogunate for well
over a year, and the Dutch naval support promised so loyally for the Philippines
expedition was used instead for a reluctant and largely ineffective bombardment
of the rebel castle.53 There was no spare military capacity for an invasion of the
Philippines, and even less of a stomach for one.
When the shogun’s advisers reviewed the Shimabara Rebellion a few months
later, a comparison was drawn between the efforts needed to take flimsy Hara
Castle and the plans to transport a similar-sized army with similar naval support
many hundreds of miles through occupied territory to take on the European fortifications of Manila. The comment was made that the ten thousand men they had
earmarked for the Philippine invasion should have been one hundred thousand
—the number of troops that had to be deployed against Hara to overcome onethird that many rebels.54 Yet such a calculation was now only an academic point,
for no further attempt would be made against the Philippines for over three
hundred years.
The shock caused by the Shimabara Rebellion then brought about the worst
fears for the remaining Portuguese in Japan: the shogun decided they should
follow the Jesuits in being deported. With the Sakoku Edict of 1639, all contact
was cut off from Catholic Europe, and even the loyal Dutch were confined to the
artificial island of Deshima in Nagasaki Bay.
Of the three schemes for invading the Philippines between 1593 and 1637, the
vast armies at Hideyoshi’s disposal in his 1593 plan could well have succeeded
against the meagre garrison of Manila had he not been humiliated already in
Korea by a woeful lack of naval support. Two seaborne attempts against Taiwan
in 1609 and 1616 were also failures, and an annexation of the Ryukyus in 1609
was to be contemporary Japan’s only overseas gain.55
The 1630 effort against the Philippines was to be led by someone who was
committed to the scheme, but there was apparently no improvement in the seaborne capacity. The chances of success also were reduced because the defences of
Manila were by then stronger than in 1593 and Taiwan had a Spanish fort on it
instead of a Japanese one. These points alone may well have led to the cancellation of the project if the Matsukura spies had ever had the chance to report back
to Shigemasa.
The popular view of the 1637 attempt gives the impression that a fleet was
ready to set sail and was stopped only by the Shimabara Rebellion, but this does
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not appear to have been the case. The Dutch made a commitment to provide
naval support and the shogun approved the scheme, but there is no evidence
that Matsukura Katsuie was waiting for the go-ahead. It is more than likely that
the invasion plans had advanced no further than the two Nagasaki officials with
their ill-informed “back of an envelope” calculations. The subsequent experience
at Hara Castle then betrayed a huge Japanese deficiency in siege artillery.56 The
walls of Manila would have been safe even if the Japanese had succeeded in getting beyond fortified Taiwan.
The issue of Japanese naval capacity would not be resolved until the twentieth
century, so when the Shimabara Rebellion forced the cancellation of the 1637
Philippines expedition it marked a point in time when Japan turned its back on
the notion of an overseas empire for three hundred years. As for the problem
of Christianity, an invasion of the Philippines would have cut off the supply of
subversive secret priests, but the flow was always only an ideological annoyance,
never an armed flood. Instead Japan responded to this minor threat by its dramatic and fateful decision in 1639 to isolate itself from European nations.
Throughout the decades under discussion, the Spanish took the Japanese
threats seriously and always responded on the basis of good intelligence. Their
exposure of Matsukura’s spies shows that their considered response to a notional
Japanese threat was managed as carefully in 1630 as it had been in 1593. Their
preparations always involved the monitoring of a potential fifth column of Japanese residents in Manila, but even when brief uprisings occurred, other Japanese
could be found fighting loyally for their Spanish masters elsewhere, so the Spanish never feared any great threat from that quarter. Their defensive actions were
prompted only by rumours of war, not war itself.
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